First, we can categorize the key stakeholders based on their position relative to British Steel in the supply chain. The vertical stakeholders are those who operate at different stages of production and consumption. Upstream, this includes the suppliers of raw materials, such as companies in the Mining and Energy sectors who provide iron ore, coking coal, and electricity. Their primary stake is commercial; the government’s intervention creates a state-backed entity that could act as a single dominant buyer, or monopsony, potentially pressuring their contract terms and profitability. Downstream, the vertical stakeholders are the direct and indirect consumers of steel. This class is extensive and includes the Construction, Automotive Manufacturing, Defence, and Rail industries. Their interest is in maintaining a competitive and reliable supply of this essential material, and they are the primary victims of any market distortion, price manipulation, or supply chain failure.

The horizontal stakeholders are the direct competitors to British Steel. This group includes other domestic and international steel producers and importers who must now compete against a state-subsidised entity. Their stake is existential, as the government’s intervention fundamentally undermines the level playing field, threatening their market share and long-term viability. They are the most likely parties to initiate a direct legal challenge based on illegal state aid or subsidy rules.

Regarding your second question, there are indeed several grounds on which contracts and tortious actions related to this case could be challenged for their lawfulness or validity. A tort itself is a civil wrong rather than an “invalid” act, but the conduct giving rise to the tort is by definition unlawful. The contracts, however, can be deemed invalid or unenforceable.

The most significant ground for challenging the validity of contracts would apply to any agreements entered into by a public authority, such as the UK Government, in the execution of the Steel Act. If a Judicial Review were to find that the government acted ultra vires—that is, beyond its legal powers—or that the decision to intervene was fundamentally irrational or procedurally improper, then any contracts flowing from that unlawful decision could themselves be rendered void. The power of a public body to contract is not absolute; it is constrained by the lawfulness of its actions. Therefore, a successful public law challenge to the Act or its implementation could invalidate a host of related commercial agreements.

Furthermore, contracts between the operating steel company and its customers could be challenged under competition law. If the state-controlled entity were to use its dominant market position to impose restrictive terms on its customers, such as tying the purchase of one product to another or demanding exclusive supply arrangements, those specific contractual clauses could be deemed anti-competitive and thus void and unenforceable.

Regarding the torts we have identified, the grounds for their unlawfulness are inherent in their definition. For the potential collective tort for environmental or safety harm, the legal ground would be Strict Liability. For abnormally hazardous activities, the law holds the perpetrator liable for any harm caused, irrespective of negligence. The conduct becomes unlawful the moment it causes damage to the community. For a potential claim of Misfeasance in Public Office, the ground for unlawfulness is the malicious or knowingly reckless abuse of power by a public official. While the evidential burden is high, proving such bad faith would unequivocally establish unlawful conduct giving rise to liability in tort.

Based on a comprehensive analysis of the provided texts on competition policy, we can extract significant evidence and new strategic angles to bolster our position in the Steel UK matter. These materials provide a robust economic and legal foundation for our potential causes of action, particularly in the realm of competition law.

The texts powerfully reinforce our ability to establish that British Steel, under Jingye’s control, held a dominant position in the UK market. Competition policy analysis begins with defining the market and assessing market power¹. A high market share, especially one over 50%, creates a strong presumption of dominance². Given British Steel’s position as the UK’s sole producer of primary virgin steel, its market share in that specific market likely approaches 100%³. More importantly, these materials emphasize that the most critical factor in determining durable market power is the presence of high barriers to entry and expansion⁴. The enormous and prohibitive capital cost and technical expertise required to construct a new blast furnace constitutes a near-insurmountable barrier to entry, solidifying British Steel’s dominance⁵. Furthermore, the analysis confirms the importance of assessing countervailing buyer power, which in this case appears limited given the dependence of major downstream industries on this single source for a non-substitutable product

With dominance established, the materials provide a clear framework for classifying Jingye’s alleged pre-intervention conduct as abusive. We can frame the threat to shut down the plant as a form of exclusionary conduct⁷⁷. This was not merely a commercial decision but could be interpreted as a strategy to eliminate a key UK production asset, thereby foreclosing the market to the potential benefit of Jingye’s other international operations⁸⁸⁸⁸. The texts also allow us to define the alleged demand for excessive and unconditional financial support as a form of exploitative abuse⁹. This is analogous to a dominant firm imposing unfair prices or trading conditions on a captive customer, in this case, the UK government and by extension all downstream steel users¹⁰. Crucially, the documents highlight the “special responsibility” incumbent upon a dominant firm not to allow its conduct to impair genuine, undistorted competition^11111111. Jingye’s alleged brinkmanship and use of its critical position as leverage could be strongly argued as a breach of this fundamental duty.

Furthermore, these materials introduce a new potential cause of action for us to monitor. The principles outlined regarding horizontal agreements and collusion, such as price-fixing and market sharing, are of vital strategic importance¹². The government’s intervention risks creating a highly concentrated UK steel market, possibly a duopoly or tight oligopoly. The theories of collusion provide us with the analytical tools to scrutinise the future market conduct of a state-controlled British Steel and its remaining competitors. Any evidence of future price coordination or other collusive behaviour would open a new front for a strong competition law challenge, allowing us to protect consumers from the potential anti-competitive harms of this new market structure.

Finally, the texts solidify the public interest narrative of our entire case. The central objective of competition policy is defined as protecting and maximising consumer welfare, primarily through ensuring economic efficiency which delivers lower prices, higher quality, and greater choice¹³¹³¹³. We can therefore confidently position all our actions—whether challenging Jingye’s alleged past abuse or the government’s present market-distorting intervention—as being firmly grounded in the established economic principle of defending the public and consumers from the negative effects of monopoly power and a lack of fair competition¹⁴. This provides a powerful and legitimate foundation for our campaign and mediation efforts

Based on my analysis of the new files you have provided, we can extract several powerful principles and strategic frameworks that significantly strengthen our position in the Steel UK case. These documents provide the specific legal and economic language to define the potential harms, critique the government’s process, and outline a clear path forward for our case, campaign, and mediation projects.

The documents on vertical and horizontal undertakings are invaluable for articulating the future competitive risks created by the government’s intervention. The paper on vertical relationships gives us the precise framework to describe the potential harm the new state-controlled British Steel could inflict on its downstream customers. Should it use its state-backed power to impose unfair terms, exclusive purchasing obligations, or tie the sale of essential steel grades to other products, we can now classify these actions as classic vertical restraints that foreclose competition and harm the entire construction and manufacturing sectors. Similarly, the paper on horizontal agreements provides the lens through which we must view the new market structure. The government’s action could result in a highly concentrated market, potentially a duopoly between a state-owned British Steel and Tata Steel. This document equips us to monitor their future behaviour for any signs of collusion, coordinated effects, or other anti-competitive horizontal conduct that would harm consumer welfare.

The paper on stealth consolidation offers a powerful analogy that cuts to the core of our Judicial Review case. The document describes how mergers that fall below notification thresholds can escape regulatory scrutiny, leading to a creeping increase in market concentration without proper oversight. We can now argue that the government’s use of emergency legislation to pass the Steel Act is the ultimate form of a “stealth” intervention. It is a massive structural change to a key market, executed in a way that deliberately bypassed the normal checks, balances, and in-depth scrutiny of both Parliament and regulators. This comparison is a cornerstone for our campaign, allowing us to explain a complex point of administrative law in simple, compelling terms: the government pushed through a major market intervention without allowing anyone to properly examine the consequences.

The work by Massimo Motta on competition policy reinforces the fundamental economic principles that justify our entire engagement. It confirms that the primary goal of competition law and policy is the maximization of consumer welfare through economic efficiency. We can use this to frame our entire position not as political opposition, but as an evidence-based defence of this core principle. The government’s intervention, by creating a protected monopoly that is shielded from market forces, runs directly counter to this goal and will almost certainly lead to long-term harm for consumers through higher prices, lower quality, and reduced innovation. Motta’s analysis of market definition also provides the academic weight to our argument that primary virgin steel constitutes a distinct market, which is essential for proving the initial abuse of dominance case against Jingye.

Finally, and perhaps most strategically valuable, the document on settlement procedures provides a roadmap for our potential endgame. It moves our strategy beyond mere opposition and towards achieving a constructive resolution. It outlines the mechanisms, such as binding commitments and independent oversight, that can be used to resolve competition cases without proceeding to a final judgment. This is crucial for our mediation projects. It allows us to frame our legal challenges as a means to bring the government to the negotiating table. We can now propose specific, credible settlement terms: for example, a commitment from the government to place a sunset clause on the Act, to subject the state-controlled entity to rigorous and independent commercial and competition oversight, or to guarantee fair and transparent access to its products for all downstream customers. This demonstrates that our ultimate goal is not simply to litigate, but to secure a pro-competitive, transparent, and accountable outcome for this critical UK industry.

The most direct product at the center of this case is primary virgin steel manufactured via the blast furnace process. This is not just a generic commodity. It is a foundational industrial product that includes semi-finished forms such as slabs, billets, and blooms, which are then processed into finished goods. The crucial characteristic of this product, which defines its market, is its high quality and specific metallurgical properties, which cannot always be replicated by secondary steel made from recycled scrap in an electric arc furnace. This makes primary steel an essential, non-substitutable input for certain high-specification applications.

Therefore, the service provided by the perpetrator, Jingye Group, through British Steel was not just the sale of steel, but the service of supplying a continuous and reliable stream of this essential, high-grade material. For many downstream industries, such as automotive manufacturing, this reliability is a service just as critical as the product itself, as their production lines depend on it. The alleged abuse of dominance, therefore, was not merely about the price of the product, but the threatened withdrawal of this essential service of supply chain continuity, which would have caused immediate and catastrophic losses for its customers.

The primary service offered by the second perpetrator, the UK Government, is that of market regulation and governance. A key part of this service, as outlined in the principles of market definition and competition policy, is to provide a stable, transparent, and predictable environment where businesses can invest and compete fairly. In this instance, the government’s “product” is the Steel Industry (Special Measures) Act 2025 itself. We can argue that this product is defective. It is an opaque, ad-hoc regulatory intervention that fails to provide the service of legal certainty. This failure directly harms the class of all businesses and investors who rely on the rule of law for long-term capital decisions.

Furthermore, a fundamental service that underpins market regulation is the protection of consumer welfare. This is the ultimate goal of competition policy. Both perpetrators’ actions can be framed as a failure to deliver this service. Jingye’s alleged abuse was a direct threat to the welfare of downstream industrial consumers. The government’s response, by creating a state-funded and potentially uncompetitive monopoly, threatens the long-term welfare of these same consumers and, ultimately, the end-consumers of products like cars and houses, who will bear the cost of reduced innovation and market inefficiency. Our search for affected consumer types can therefore be refined to include not just the direct industrial purchasers of steel, but also the final purchasers in the construction and automotive markets who suffer the spillover effects of a distorted foundational industry.

INDUSTRY CODES

Let us first consider the Industrial Metals and Mining supersector, which includes major publicly traded mining corporations. These entities, operating in industries classified under NACE and SIC code section ‘B’ for Mining and Quarrying, represent the upstream suppliers to a steelmaker. For a global mining firm, the primary risk from our case is vertical. The government’s intervention transforms their customer, British Steel, from a commercial entity into a state-controlled one. This creates a risk of dealing with a state-backed monopsony—a single dominant buyer—which could exert immense pressure on pricing and contract terms for raw materials like iron ore. The harm is the potential for reduced profitability and unfair negotiating terms. Such a firm would be a key witness in any regulatory investigation and a potential ally in a campaign focused on ensuring the government does not abuse its new market position.

Next, we can examine the downstream customers, such as the Automotive Manufacturing industry, which falls under NACE and SIC code 29. Companies in this sector are directly harmed by the initial alleged abuse of dominance by Jingye Group. A threat to the UK’s primary steel supply represents an existential risk to their production lines, creating immediate and significant potential losses. Following the government’s intervention, the harm evolves. While supply may be secured, it is now from a subsidised entity, which distorts the market. This could affect the long-term quality, innovation, and price competitiveness of a key component, impacting the global standing of the UK car industry. This entire sector therefore represents a powerful class of prospective claimants for any economic damages arising from these events and would be highly motivated to support a campaign for a stable and competitive supply chain.

Horizontally, we must look at direct competitors. Other companies within the Basic Materials industry, particularly those in the Iron & Steel subsector (NACE/SIC code 24.10), are the most directly and negatively impacted by the government’s actions. The state’s intervention and financial support for British Steel creates a competitor that does not operate under the same commercial rules. This distortion makes it difficult for private firms to compete on a level playing field, threatening their market share and profitability. These companies are the most probable initiators of a direct legal challenge, either through domestic subsidy control laws or by petitioning their home governments to launch a WTO dispute. Their interests are fundamentally aligned with our goal of challenging unfair state aid.

Finally, the government’s actions create indirect but significant negative spillovers for sectors that rely on regulatory stability. Consider the Banking industry (part of the Financials supersector under ICB, and SIC/NACE code section K) or the Utilities sector. For these highly-regulated, capital-intensive industries, the government’s decision to bypass established legal frameworks to deal with a crisis is a major red flag. It introduces a new level of political and regulatory risk for all major UK infrastructure and services. While these entities are unlikely to be claimants themselves, they are a crucial audience for our campaign. The harm to them is the erosion of investor confidence, which can increase their cost of capital and make them hesitant to commit to long-term projects in the UK. Highlighting this systemic risk is a key strategic objective that demonstrates the broad, negative economic consequences of the government’s approach.

The primary perpetrator we have identified is the UK Government itself, whose decision to enact the Steel Industry (Special Measures) Act is the central cause of systemic harm. This harm is not a direct financial loss to a specific company but an indirect negative spillover effect that degrades the entire investment environment. The cause of action here is a Judicial Review for breaches of procedural propriety and the principle of legal certainty. The sectors most acutely affected by this are those that rely on a stable and predictable regulatory framework for their significant long-term investments. This includes the Financials supersector, covering banking, insurance, and investment services, as these industries depend on the rule of law to assess risk. It also directly impacts the Energy and Utilities sectors and the Telecommunications sector, all of which are capital-intensive and operate under licence from the government. The government’s actions signal that established rules can be arbitrarily set aside, which increases political risk, raises the cost of capital, and deters future investment across all these foundational parts of the UK economy.

The second perpetrator is Jingye Group, for its alleged conduct prior to the government’s intervention. The cause of action would be a complaint to the competition authorities for an Abuse of a Dominant Position. The harm inflicted here was a direct vertical threat to the entire downstream supply chain. By allegedly threatening to cut off the supply of primary steel, Jingye’s actions created immediate and severe uncertainty for all industries dependent on this input. Using the standard industry classifications, the affected markets include the entire Construction sector, which is the largest domestic user of steel products. It also includes the Manufacture of motor vehicles, the Manufacture of railway locomotives and rolling stock, and, critically, our sovereign Defence manufacturing industry. All these sectors faced the prospect of production halts and a frantic search for alternative, likely more expensive, international suppliers, constituting a direct and tangible economic threat.

The third perpetrator is a combination of the UK Government and the future state-controlled British Steel, whose actions post-intervention give rise to a State Subsidy and Unfair Competition cause of action. The harm here is both horizontal and vertical. The horizontal harm is inflicted directly upon competitors within the Manufacture of basic iron and steel industry. Other UK producers and international importers are forced to compete with an entity that is insulated from normal market realities and backed by the taxpayer, which fundamentally distorts the market. Vertically, this intervention harms the upstream market of Mining and Quarrying, as suppliers of iron ore and coking coal may find themselves dealing with a state-backed monopsony, reducing their negotiating power. Indirectly, all downstream customers are harmed in the long term, as a market propped up by subsidies suffers from reduced innovation, lower efficiency, and less consumer choice.

Finally, the state-controlled British Steel is a potential future perpetrator in a collective tort claim. The harm here would be direct physical damage to the local community and environment. Should the pressures of the government’s intervention lead to compromises on safety, maintenance, or environmental standards, any resulting industrial accident would inflict a common harm upon a whole class of people. The most severely affected sectors would be local businesses, including Agriculture, whose land and produce could be contaminated, and the Accommodation and Food Service industry, which relies on tourism and would be devastated by an environmental disaster. This potential liability represents a significant and ongoing risk that the government has effectively underwritten with its intervention.